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Some resource-dependent countries experience substantial increases in
government revenue during natural resource booms. Recent theoretical and
empirical contributions (Robinson et al. 2006, Brollo et al. 2013) have ar-
gued that such abundance of windfalls can have a negative effect on the
functioning of local institutions. In particular, abundance of windfalls could
increase the incidence of corruption because their presence aggravates the
moral hazard problem that exists between citizens and their elected author-
ities. This is so because an increased budget means that officials can ap-
propiate rents illegally without compromising their obligations with the elec-
torate, thus distorting the inferences that citizens make about their authorities’
competence. Furthermore, such agency problem could be aggravated by the
self-selection of relatively worse candidates entering politics (assuming rents
are more valuable for the relatively less skilled), because incumbent may-
ors (including corrupt ones) would face weaker competition. Exploiting sub-
stantial time and spatial variation in the amount of mining-related transfers
received by the districts of Peru during the 2000s commodity boom, I imple-
ment a difference-in-differences strategy to put the mentioned theory to test.
I find evidence supporting the hypothesis of a non-monotonic effect of wind-
falls on the incidence of corruption, and a negative effect of windfalls on the
quality of candidates drawn to challenge incumbents and compete for public
office. I do not find strong evidence of the theorized relationship between
the two phenomena, but I propose further research pathways to improve our
understanding of the results.
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The boom of international mineral prices that took place from 2003 through 2012
translated into an unprecedented increase in transfers targeting subnational gov-
ernments in Peru. While resource-based growth has a long history in this country,
the arrangement of decentralized polities with access to such a large share of its
gains is relatively new. Indeed, the massive redistribution that took place was the
result of the Canon Law (its latest version1), which had been passed as recently
as 2001, and stated that 50% of the revenue tax paid by mining companies should
return to producing areas.
This context of abundance generated a renewed discussion on the conse-
quences of resource-based development; in particular, whether resource abun-
dance is a blessing or a curse. The present study draws from the theoretical
and empirical literature of the “Natural resource curse” (NRC hereafter) in order
to contribute to our understanding of the political effects of this commodity boom.
Exploiting a source of data that has been underutilized, this paper studies
how the increase of fiscal windfalls affected the incidence of corruption and the
composition and quality of political representation at the subnational level. As
posited by the NRC literature (Robinson et al. 2006, Brollo et al. 2013) resource
windfalls can have a negative effect on such outcomes through the following chan-
nels: enhanced agency problems (an increased budget means that officials can
benefit from increased rents without compromising their obligations with the elec-
torate), and, closely related, self-selection of relatively worse candidates entering
politics (assuming rents are more valuable for the relatively less skilled).
The structure of this document is as follows. Section 1 provides an overview
of the political explanations of the resource curse developed to date. This is fol-
lowed by the theoretical framework in Section 2, which draws from recent devel-
opments in the field of positive political economy. Section 3 describes the way in
which mining rents’ transfers work in Peru and also the available sources of data.
1The institution of the Canon has been in place for a long time, but it has had important
variations and its last modification implied a significant increase in the share that returned to the
producing areas. For details, see Gruber and Orihuela 2017.
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1.1 The Political Aspects of the Natural Resource Curse: An
Overview
The stylized fact that resource rich economies tend to have a worse economic
performance than their resource-poor counterparts has been revisited multiple
times. The evidence supporting this counterintuitive regularity was so overwhelm-
ing (Sachs and Warner 1995) that it received a rather fatalist denomination: the
natural resource curse. For a long time, however, there was a persistent gap be-
tween our understanding of the economic mechanisms through which this curse
operates2 and the still weak understanding of the political mechanisms.
Following a seminal paper by M. Ross (1999), the political mechanisms
through which a resource curse opperates can be classified into three broad cat-
egories. The first one, cognitive explanations, includes works such as Nurske and
Watkins’ about how resource rents generate a “get-rich-quick” mentality among
businessmen and a short-sighted behavior by the policy makers. A second cat-
egory, societal explanations, emphasizes the role of non-state actors that push
for growth-impeding policies once they see their bargaining power increased by
a context of abundance. This is the well-known literature about resource-induced
protectionism. Finally, there is a third, separate though quite hybrid, group: state-
centered explanations. The main assertion here is that a state relying on transfer
revenues (natural resource rents, for example) becomes less accountable to their
constituencies. This could happen because rents allow a general decrease in
taxation (Morrison 2007) or increased possibilities to buy off the opposition (Ace-
moglu et al. 2004).
A new strand of the NRC literature started to move away from the tra-
ditional cross-country approach and started to look into particular institutional
settings where the availability of microdata made it possible to test empirically
2These include but are not limited to: the ‘Dutch disease’, the volatility of growth because
of commodity prices fluctuations, and the few linkages of extractive sectors with the rest of the
economy.
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the mechanisms outlined above. These contributions revealed that the effects of
abundant natural resources on economic outcomes depended critically on insti-
tutional factors such as the rule of law, checks and balances mechanisms, and
electoral competition. The present study focuses on state-centered explanations
of the resource curse, following this microeconomic approach.
1.2 Empirical Political Economy: State-Centered Explanations
Put to Test
The insight that an increase in rents may exacerbate agency problems and fa-
cilitate corruption receives support from the findings of Brollo et al. (2013), and
Casselli and Michaels (2013). Exploiting a discontinuity generated by the rule
for assigning federal transfers in Brazil, the first study finds that a 10% increase
in transfers raises the incidence of corruption by 7.3 percentage points. They
also find that the mechanism behind this is a decreased electoral punishment for
corruption (again, exploiting the discontinuity). At the same time, windfalls abun-
dance attract a relatively worse pool of candidates; thus enhancing the agency
problem since the incumbent faces less "dangerous" competitors. In particular,
this increase in transfers causes a reduction of 2.7 percentage points in the frac-
tion of opponents to the incumbent that hold at least a college degree.
Casselli and Michaels (2013) find that oil windfalls contribute little to im-
proving living standards of the citizens and data from Brazilian media and federal
police indicates that this might be explained by a waste of resources induced by
the mayors’ increasing association with illegal activities. Carreri and Dube (2016)
find that a rise in oil windfalls, during Colombia’s internal conflict, induced an in-
crease in the use of force to gain power, in particular, an increase in right-wing
paramilitary violence that reduces electoral competition.
In the case of Peru we find empirical studies about the effects of fiscal
windfalls on outcomes such as public good provision (Maldonado 2014), effi-
ciency of local government expenditures (Ardanaz and Maldonado 2016), invest-
ments in the formation of human capital (Ñopo et al. 2016, Calle 2017) and
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citizens’ support of democracy (Maldonado 2015).
Maldonado (2011) studies the effects of increased windfalls on corrup-
tion and is therefore the empirical contribution that is more closely related to the
present work. There, corruption is measured using the Module on Governance
of the National Household Survey, where citizens are asked whether they have
been required to pay bribes by municipal authorities or employees. One limitation
of this source of data is that it relies on self reported information from citizens,
who don’t have incentives to reveal the truth about their involvement in illegal
activities. However, the main concern about using such measure of corruption
incidence is that it tends to capture only one kind of corruption and arguably not
the most harmful to local institutions.
Indeed, recent reports by the Public Prosecutors’ Office Specialized in Cor-
ruption Crimes (PPEDC hereafter, for its acronym in Spanish) complain that pros-
ecuting this petty corruption (in which the amount of civil damages are not so
high and the public officials involved are low-rank) leaves them with little time to
investigate big corruption, involving top-rank officials (PPEDC, 2012). This paper
makes a contribution in this sense, by using official data from the PPEDC, which
includes small, medium and large corruption cases.
One last observation about previous NRC-related studies for Peru has to
do with how they have dealt with electoral competition. In most political economy
models theoretical predictions regarding final outcomes (such as public good pro-
vision, efficiency in expenditure, composition of expenditure, among others) de-
pend critically on an intermediate outcome which is electoral competition.
Both Maldonado (2014, 2015, 2016) and Calle (2017) account for this by
considering a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index meant to capture the degree of com-
petition in the election. It is constructed as a standard HHI, summing over the
squares of the candidates’ vote shares in the district. The limitation of this in-
dicator of political competition is that it is blind to who is entering the pool of
competitors. Moreover, what is interpreted as “enhanced political competition”
(which has a positive connotation for economists) is not always seen in such an
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optimistic light by political scientists who often consider this a symptom of the
pulverization of political power (Levitsky 2001, Vergara 2011). The theoretical
framework adopted in the present work takes into account that the composition of
the pool of opponents is likely to be endogenously determined as natural resource
rents abundance changes the incentives to hold public office. This is the second
contribution of the paper to the study of the Resource Curse in Peru.
2 Theory: Agency Problems and Selection into Pol-
itics
Political economy models attribute three main roles to elections (Persson and
Tabellini, 2000). First, if electoral promises can be enforced, elections serve
mainly as a means to select among policy platforms. If, on the other hand, the
performance of the mayor is not observable to its constituents, then we are in the
setting of a standard agency problem3. In this context, and under the assumption
that politicians value their political survival, elections can serve as a disciplining
mechanism in two ways. The most direct way is that citizens can punish an un-
derperforming incumbent by not reelecting her. The second is more subtle and it
has to do with the fact that economic performance of the district serves as a sig-
nal of the mayor’s competence, which is in turn rewarded with reelection4. This
restrains the mayor’s rent-seeking behavior, because appropriation of rents could
compromise the district’s economic performance.
Brollo et al. (2013) developed an extension of the career concerns model
in which the agency problem can be further enhanced by a negative selection
effect that worsens the pool of opponents to incumbent politicians. The present
work draws from this recent contribution.
3It is an agency problem assuming there is a dilemma for the elected official between acting
upon her best interest or her constituents’. An example is the dilemma between appropriating
resources illegally or using the resources to provide public goods. The dilemma could be more
simple, such as choosing the level of effort she will exert in order to provide good public services,
knowing that the principal (electors) are not able to observe what she is actually doing.
4This is usually referred to as the career concerns model
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The model’s predictions can be summarized as follows. First, the agency
problem is enhanced by the availability of an exogenous increase of non-tax rev-
enue for the district. This is so because in a context of abundance the mayor
has leeway to appropriate more rents for herself without compromising her ca-
pacity to attend her constituents’ demands (i.e. electoral punishment decreases
as windfalls increase). Second, if rents are more valuable to the relatively less
skilled, then a selection effect worsens the pool of candidates attracted to pub-
lic office. This, in turn, magnifies the agency problem because the incumbent
faces a weaker competition and her reappointment chances are unchanged or
even improved, even if she is appropriating more illegal rents. The remainder
of this section presents the set up of the formal model, as developed in Brollo
et al. (2013) and discusses its main theoretical predictions. Every hypothesis’
plausibility is assessed in the light of the institutional context we are analyzing.
2.1 The Model
Consider two periods; one (t = 1) in which the incumbent sets policy and elec-
tions are held, and another (t = 2) in which the elected mayor sets policy once
more. In each period the district receives a budget of size τ which can be allo-
cated, alternatively, to rt (rents for the mayor) or gt (public good for the citizens).
Competent mayors can provide the same level of public good provision (in terms
of voters’ utility) at a lower resource cost. In particular:
gt = θ(τ − rt) (1)
where θ reflects individual competence in providing the public good. A
higher θ is equivalent to a lower cost of providing any given level of public good
and therefore a high level of θ characterizes a more competent mayor. Voters
can not observe the politicians’ competence but they can observe their type J ,
which is an observable characteristic that serves as a predictor of competence.
The realization of θ is drawn from two alternative distributions which depend on
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J . Both have the same (uniform) density, but different means as shown in the
following equation:
Mean of θ = 1 + σJ , J = H,L (2)
σH = σ = −σL
with σ a known parameter. Thus, the expected value of competence of an
individual when she is of type H,E[θJ = H] is higher than that of an individual
whose type is L, [θJ = L]. In Brollo et.al (2013) the type is approximated using the
years of schooling of the candidate and whether or not she has a college degree.
The "type" should satisfy two conditions. First, it should be highly correlated with
individual competence; and, second, it should be actually used by the voters as
a shortcut to infer it. In Peruvian subnational elections, it is quite uncommon that
a candidate appeals to voters by advertising their academic credentials. A much
more valued characteristic seems to be experience. This is why in the empiri-
cal analysis we will have two alternative measures of the candidate’s "type", the
standard one related to education, and a second one related to work experience.
Returning to the set up of the model, the incumbent’s and the opponents’
types are known to everyone before the elections but the actual competence of
any candidate is known only if elected. Also, voters observe their own utility in
terms of the provision of the public good g1 but don’t observe rents r1.
There is a risk for the incumbent of being caught appropriating rents ille-
gally, which would cause her a utility loss of λJ . An important assumption is that
the utility loss is higher for a high-quality (type H) mayor (i.e. λH > λL > 0). This
is meant to capture the fact that a high-quality mayor has a more valuable outside
option in the private sector.
Let d(rt) = qrt be the probability that a corrupt mayor is caught by an official
audit. Then the expected utility of a mayor of type J who is in office in periods 2
and 1 would be:
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V J2 = r2 − λJqr2 +R (3)
V J1 = r1 − λJqr1 +R + P JV J2 (4)
where R are exogenous “ego rents” that enter the utility function of politi-
cians in any standard model of political economy and P J is the probability of
reelection (as perceived by the incumbent in period 1, when she decides how
much r1 is optimal). Rearranging the first two terms in equations 3 and 4 (specifi-
cally, factoring out r2), yields (1− λJq)r2. Therefore, (1− λJq) captures the value
of rents for a mayor of type J . Because of the previous assumption about the
differential utility loss depending on type J (λH > λL), the expected value of rents
is higher for low quality mayors. The utility of voters is simply: Wt = gt.
I outline here the timing of events just as they are presented in the model
developed by Brollo et al. 2013. At the beginning of period 1, the mayor sets
r1 (the amount of rents to appropriate). At this point, she knows her own type
(HorL) but not yet her own competence (θ). She does not know her future oppo-
nent’s type either. Consistent with previous notation, the expected quality of the
opponent will be: σ̂ = πσH+(1−π)σL. An important contribution of the cited work
is that the model allows for π (the probability of an opponent being of type H, or,
more simply, the fraction of opponents of type H) to be endogenous.
Next, the type of the opponent (but not her competence) becomes known
to all and elections are held. Voters observe: g1, the incumbent’s type J and
the opponent’s type J . They don’t observe r1. Then, audits happen and corrupt
mayors may get caught. In period 2 the elected mayor sets r2 and a final audit
takes place5.
5It is important to note that the model set up is consistent with a particular institutional setting
where random audits take place. Because I focus on a different institutional setting, there are
some mechanisms that I am not able to test meticulously, like the effect of the disclosure of
corruption, for example. This will be explained in more detail in the following sections.
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2.2 Theoretical predictions
Throughout this section, by rents I refer to public resources illegally appropriated
by the mayor. In the empirical section, however, the outcome variable will be
dichotomous (whether the mayor is involved in corruption or not). ‘Rents’ serves
just as a synonym of corruption in this section. The predictions are obtained
when solving for the equilibrium of the model and all derivations can be found in
the Online Appendix of Brollo et al. 20136.




in absolute value as the level of transfers rises (Part 1). Because of this, rents are




> 0 (Part 2).
Voters base their inferences of the mayor’s ability on the observed out-
comes (how the incumbent satisfies certain expectations of public good provision,
in this model). Increased windfalls would leave room to appropriate part of them
and still satisfy such expectations. The inference is therefore distorted and voters
will not (effectively) discipline mayors’ behavior through electoral choices.
Prediction 2. Rents are a decreasing function of the quality of the incum-
bent (Part 1) and of the expected quality of the opponent (Part 2).
The intuition behind this is that a high quality incumbent faces a larger
penalty for being discovered involved in corruption scandals because she would
lose relatively more profitable opportunities in the private sector. The second part
of this prediction is related to the fact that a tougher competition for the incum-
bent increases her incentives to please voters (by increasing the allocation of
resources to public goods, thus reducing the rents she grabs).
Prediction 3. The effect of budget size on rents (positive, according to
Prediction 1) is smaller the higher is the expected quality of the pool of opponents.
In other words, the effect stated in prediction 1 is attenuated if the incum-
bent expects an upgraded pool of opponents. This, however, is usually not the
case. Because of other considerations, the model predicts that the quality of the
pool tends to deteriorate simultaneously, resulting in an even worse outcome. So
6Stable link here.
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far we have described the aggravated moral hazard effect, taking the composition
of the pool of candidates as given. Allowing for endogenous entry of candidates
(i.e. π is endogenously determined), two additional predictions hold.
Prediction 4: The quality of the pool of candidates is a decreasing function
of transfers.
In terms of the model set up: ∂π
∂τ
> 0 (the share of low quality candidates
increases when transfers increase). This is explained because the value of rents
is higher for low quality mayors as opposed to high quality mayors (see previous
subsection). This is connected to the following prediction.





The rationale for this is that as the pool of challengers becomes worse,
voters have a lower bar to reappoint an incumbent mayor.
Finally, taking into account all the channels of impact (moral hazard effect
plus the aggravating selection effect):
Prediction 6. The overall effect of transfers on rents is positive.
There is one caveat to point out about prediction 1, and consequently, pre-
diction 6. Anectodal evidence by Arellano (2011), reported that in mining areas
citizens are not necessarily lethargic in the presence of abundant resources. In
contrast, they sometimes push for a quick (though not necessarily efficient) ex-
penditure of resources, fearing that authorities may benefit from them before citi-
zens can reap the benefits. I consider this is a relevant observation and to keep
the adaptation of the model in line with our present setting, I will also consider in
the empirical section an alternative estimation where the effect of windfalls can
be non-monotonic. In other words, it could be the case that up to some point
of windfalls the effect on corruption is positive, but such effect decays and could
even become negative past certain threshold where windfalls are extremely high.
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2.3 Competing theoretical frameworks
There are some challenges to this theoretical approach that are worth addressing
before continuing to the empirical section.
The first one is that this model abstracts from the first stated role of elec-
tions, namely, aggregating heterogeneous preferences. In that sense, it leaves
out, for example, redistribution and other aspects in which conflicting interests
among voters arise, and focuses exclusively on the accountability role of elec-
tions, which is in the common interest of voters.
This is questionable but plausible in a context in which party labels are
not strong 7. Also, it could be argued that, if this role is important (aggregating
preferences), then it is likely to weaken the other role (accountability) because
voters would face a trade off between favoring their preferences and effectively
disciplining politicians (Persson et al. 1997).
There is another challenge, much more fundamental: it could be the case
that voters are not even concerned about holding politicians accountable, but are
rather interested in benefiting from their illegal activities 8. In this case, a more
approriate framework would be one of patronage.
Another important aspect that could be questioned is the nature of the
disciplining mechanism. In the adopted model, rent-seeking by incumbents is
restricted by the need to signal competence to voters. A plausible deviation from
this would be that reelection does not depend simply on incumbents pleasing
voters but rather on pleasing them to the point in which they can deter challengers.
The work by Caselli (2006) is an example of this approach. The incumbent
politician, in the context of an increased budget, must decide how much will be
assigned to public goods and how much to appropriated rents. In order to avoid
competition, the incumbent provides more g to create an environment favorable
7In 2010, for example, out of 982 authorities running for reelection, only 375 (38%) were doing
so under the same party label with which they were elected in 2006.
8This could happen, for example, because after repeated elections, voters come to the con-
clusion that politics are intrinsically corrupt, and therefore what they maximize is their probability
of benefiting from it. An anecdotal evidence favoring this view would be the former governor of
Moquegua, who admitted in front of a public audience "I indeed stole, but I shared with all of you"
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to investment, so that the opportunity cost (for entrepreneurs) of running is higher.
However, if windfalls continue to increase, the political value of holding office may
be so high that it is not possible to deter entry, and the mayor will dedicate to
appropriate as much as she can during the current period.
This approach is interesting, but it demands finding a good measure of
how the incumbent tries to make the private sector more attractive. Using just
the level of investment on public goods might be a very loose definition. This
falls outside the scope of this work. Something interesting about the cited work,
however, is that it introduces the notion that effects of windfalls on corruption may
be non-monotonic. This was already mentioned and will be revisited in following
sections.
3 Institutional Background and Data
Having completed the detailed description of the theoretical framework, I pro-
ceed to describe the Institutional Background in which I intend to put the relevant
hypotheses to test. As pointed out in the introduction, Peru experienced an accel-
erated increase in its mining-related revenue because of the rise in the prices of
gold, copper, zinc, nickel and tin. Figure (3) in the Appendix shows the evolution
of prices. A relevant feature of this commodity boom that distinguishes it from
previous ones is the degree of redistribution that took place. As stated by the
Mining Canon Law of 2001, after corporate tax is collected from mining compa-
nies, 50% of this revenue has to return to producing areas. The distribution rule
is as follows:
• 10% is transferred to the Municipality of the producing district
• 25% is distributed among the districts in the producing province
• 40% is distributed among the districts in the producing department
• 25% is transferred to the Regional Government, and out of this 20% (i.e.
5% of total) is earmarked for Regional Universities
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Table 1: Per capita canon by type of district and electoral cycle
2002 2006 2010
Mean N Mean N Mean N
Producing district 11.48 67 204.58 89 959.41 107
Non-producer, in producing prov. 8.48 454 106.57 546 461.38 596
Non-producer, in producing dept. 12.24 941 47.79 829 198.13 672
Districts in non-producing dept. 0.24 350 0.46 342 10.19 421
Source: Own based on SIAF (Ministry of Economy and Finance). Mean for the last row
should be zero, but is different from zero because districts in Apurimac which do receive
canon are coded as being in a non-producer department. Further checks must be made
into this but this does not compromise the empirical analysis because data on transfers
was retrieved from SIAF and is complete for every district (including Apurimac).
The most important mineral deposits are located in the highlands of Peru;
but with redistribution happening as explained before, most districts in the coast
received important resources too (because many departments lie on both geo-
graphical regions at the same time). The easternmost part of Peru, however, has
been largely unaffected in terms of mining transfers. Table 1 presents the mean
of canon per capita received by each group of districts: producing districts, non-
producing districts in producing provinces, non-producing districts in producing
departments and districts in non-producing departments. We can see that, on
average, canon transfers to municipalities increased in more than 3400% from
2002 to 2010.
Figures (6) through (8) in the Appendix present another depiction of the
spectacular increase in transfers. This is, furthermore, relevant for the valid-
ity of my identification strategy because it shows the geographical variation in
the amount of canon received. Two contiguous districts, similar in almost every
observable aspect, can receive significantly different amounts of transfers, just
because of the assignment rule.
Another salient but not so positive feature of municipalities in Peru is that
they tend to be the setting of most corruption crimes. According to a recent re-
port by the PPEDC, one in every four Peruvian districts has a former mayor being
investigated for collusion, illicit enrichment, embezzlement, or related charges
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(PPEDC, 2017). In 2012, they were the second most frequent setting for cor-
ruption crimes (13%), only after ministries of the executive (PPEDC 2012). In
2014, the share of cases prosecuted originating from district municipalities had
increased from 13% to 38% (Arbizu, 2014). As noted by the former head of
the PPEDC, the combination of administrative autonomy and significant mining-
related fiscal transfers generates a context in which it is highly likely that authori-
ties use public resources for their personal interest (idem).
These observations and the recent studies for our neighboring countries in
part motivate this paper. The necessary data to carry out the analysis came from
three main sources: the National Jury of Elections, the Ministry of Economy and
Finance, and the Public Prosecutors’ Office Specialized in Corruption Crimes.
The data on election outcomes was provided by the National Jury of Elec-
tions (JNE). This includes the list of candidates and the electoral results of every
district for years 2002, 2006, 2010, and 20149. Using this source of data, I con-
structed a district-level panel of four periods, and I was able to create indicators
of 1) whether the incumbent was running in the election, and 2) whether the in-
cumbent won the election. The incumbency indicators were constructed only for
2006, 2010 and 2014. Doing so for 2002 would have required access to data from
1998, which is not publicly available. An extensive description of this and other
electoral outcomes can be found in tables (8) through (10) in the Appendix.
The variables used to measure the quality of opponents to the incumbent
are: the average years of work experience of the pool of opponents, the average
years of education of the pool of opponents, and the fraction of opponents with
higher education. All of them were calculated using the resumes that candidates
presented in order to run in the municipal elections of 2006, 2010 and 2014. Prior
to this, it was not mandatory to present a resume. The data were also provided by
the National Jury of Elections (JNE). Each resume includes personal information
(age, place of birth, time of residence in the district), educational information,
work experience records, history of party militancy, and (only for 2010) a self
9For every election, around 2-3% of districts have missing data. Details can be found in the
Appendix.
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reported approximation of annual income and assets’ value. Although there were
some changes in the resume template that candidates filled out every election,
the information is still comparable.
Calculating the average years of work experience of the pool of opponents
was relatively straightforward. Calculating the fraction of opponents with higher
education, on the other hand, posed a challenge. Many candidates report in the
section of “Higher education” any educational activity after high school, many of
which don’t strictly qualify as higher education. For this reason, a set of rules was
used to define what higher education was. They are summarized here:
• Type of education: University & “Titulacion/grado/egresado” & Length of
activity ≥ 4 years
• Type of education: Technical & “Titulación/grado/egresado” & Length of ac-
tivity ≥ 2.5 years
• Type of education: Masters & Length of activity ≥ 9 months
Finally, the total years of education were calculated as the sum of years
reported under basic education and higher education (having filtered out those
activities that did not qualify). It is important to note that, in line with the theoretical
model, the three variables refer to the pool of opponents to the incumbent and
therefore, are only meaningful in districts where there is an incumbent running10.
The descriptives in the Appendix show that around 60% of incumbents run for
reelection every period. Therefore, restricting the sample to those districts still
leaves us with an important part of the universe11.
The district level data on canon transfers comes from SIAF, the Ministry of
Economy’s repository of public finances data. Specifically, the information gath-
ered is the amount listed under “Monto acreditado” for item “Canon Minero”, every
10Also, by definition, they are calculated excluding the incumbent.
11Some additional estimations that do not conform to the model but can provide suggestive
additional evidence could be performed using all districts. In that case, the variables used would
be the average years of work experience of the pool of candidates, and the fraction of candidates
with higher education. Emphasis is on candidates to remind that these variables are meaningful
for all districts, regardless of an incumbent deciding to run. This falls outside the scope of the
present work, but is part of a future researach agenda.
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year from 1998 to 2016. These amounts are converted to constant soles of 2009
using the official Central Bank Price Index. Per capita measures are constructed
using population estimates from INEI (Peru’s National Institute of Statistics). Us-
ing data from Peru’s Ministry of Energy and Mines I am able to identify which
districts have active producing locations in each electoral period. As expected,
these districts received amounts of per capita canon transfers that were, on aver-
age, four times those received by the rest of districts, at the peak of the commodity
boom.
In the model discussed, there is a moral hazard effect of higher contempo-
raneous windfalls and a selection effect that aggravates the moral hazard prob-
lem (because mayors face weaker competition). In that sense, and considering
that there is a time dimension in the data, corruption is affected by contempora-
neous windfalls and by past windfalls that have deteriorated the current pool of
politicians. The empirical tests that aim at disentangling moral hazard from the
selection effect require a careful consideration of the timing of events.
For this reason, I construct two measures of per capita canon, and I use
the one that is relevant in each estimation. The first measure is the average canon
transfers received by the district in the four years following the election. For 2002,
it would be an average of 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 transfers, for example.
Elected officials assume their post in January of the year following the election,
so this would be a measure of the windfalls available during their time as mayors.
I use this measure of canon to test part 2 of hypothesis 1 (that windfalls increase
the incidence of corruption), and hypothesis 3 (that this effect is attenuated if
mayors face tougher competition), because they both have to do with the moral
hazard effect.
The second measure considered is the average canon transfers received
in the four year period leading to the election. For example, in 2010, it is an aver-
age of transfers received in 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010. This measure is useful
when testing hypothesis 4, which has to do with a worsening pool of opponents.
The reason is that the quality of the pool of opponents that are drawn to challenge
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the incumbent in year t (or, more generally, the quality of candidates attracted to
compete in electoral year t) is likely influenced by the expected windfalls to be
received during the years following t. Our assumption is that the best prediction
that potential candidates can make about those future transfers is based on the
transfers that were received by the district in the most recent years.
The test of hypothesis 5, related to the probability of reelection of the in-
cumbent, also makes use of this lagged measure of canon transfers because
—just like the quality of opponents—reelection is an outcome that happens in
year t (unlike corruption, which happens during the mayoral term starting in t+1).
Hypothesis 6 is the final prediction relating windfalls and rents, once all
channels of impact (moral hazard, selection effects) have been taken into ac-
count. A tentative specification of this hypothesis includes both the contempora-
neous and the lagged measure of per capita canon. This is detailed further in
Section 5.
The data on corruption comes from the PPEDC. The category corruption
charges includes crimes committed against public administration such as collu-
sion, embezzlement, abuse of authority, among others. There is an important
caveat to point out about this source. The PPEDC only discloses information
about processes that already have a definitive sentence. Therefore, we only have
information about mayors/candidates with a sentence for corruption, but not about
mayors/candidates with corruption charges more generally. This is a limitation of
our corruption measure because given the sluggishness of the Peruvian judicial
system, only a minority of cases get a definitive sentence (condemnatory or ab-
solutory) in a reasonable time.
This potentially generates a bias in our corruption measure because, given
how our judicial system works, it is possible that the most corrupt individuals
manage to get away without a sentence. The future research agenda includes
1) complementing this information with news scraped from regional sources, 2)
changing the indicator of corruption to be 1 not only if the mayor is corrupt but
also if her "front men" are.
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4 Methodology
For estimating the effect of canon transfers on the aforementioned political out-
comes, I use a difference-in-differences approach. Mining transfers from the cen-
tral government to the local municipalities would constitute the “treatment”. The
source of exogenous time variation in these transfers, I argue, is the spike in in-
ternational prices of minerals that started in 2003. Given that Peru, in spite of
being an important producer, is a price-taker in the international market of mineral
commodities (see arrow 1 in Figure (1)), it is plausible to treat the price boom
as a valid source of exogeneity explaining the large increase of fiscal windfalls.
Figure (3) in the Appendix depicts the evolution of international prices of the most
important minerals in Peru’s export bundle.
A potential endogeneity concern is that the rise in prices eventually affects
production decisions, which in turn affect local economic activity and can directly
cause corruption to increase. Then, we would have both transfers and corruption
jointly determined by a “production effect” (see arrows 2 and 3 in Figure (1)) and
we would not be able to isolate the “rentist effect”.
Figure 1: Identification Strategy
However, as argued by Ardanaz and Maldonado (2016), changes in pro-
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duction take a relatively long time. The expansion of installed capacity in response
to international prices occurs with a lag of about 7 years, while the effect in trans-
fers is almost immediate. Our outcomes are measured four years apart, and not
so long after the commodity boom began. For this reason, I argue that in the short
term the causal effect is correctly identified, once we control for year fixed effects
(time trends) and district fixed effects (unobservable but constant heterogeneity).
However, the potential of production as a confounding variable is not negligible
and therefore we replicate every estimation excluding producing districts, since
they are relatively few (around 5% of districts) and their exclusion from the sam-
ple does not compromise statistical power. It is important to mention that the
redistribution of canon resources usually happens one-and-a-half years after rev-
enues of a given fiscal period are collected. Therefore, if the international boom
of mineral prices occurred between 2003 and 2012, we witness the associated
increase in transfers approximately between 2005 and 2014. It is also notewor-
thy that even though the boom started in 2003, the prices began to skyrocket in
2005, and there was a corresponding steep increase in transfers in 2007. For
these reasons, 2006 was chosen as the appropriate baseline year.
Geographical variation in the amount of mining transfers received comes
from the redistribution rule that was detailed in the preceding section. An addi-
tional aspect to comment about this pattern is that, as shown in figures (6) through
(8), there are some departments that are almost entirely unaffected by the in-
crease in mining transfers: Callao, Loreto, Tumbes, and Ucayali. This means that
there is very little spatial variation within these departments, which is important
for the validity of the identification strategy. Therefore, every estimation will be
replicated excluding them.
Now I turn to the specific steps followed to test the predictions of the the-
oretical section. I first restate the predictions of the model in terms of our insti-
tutional background. Then, I describe the estimations that are feasible with the
available data.
The first hypothesis is that there is a positive effect of mining windfalls on
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the probability that a mayor is involved in corruption (part 2 of Prediction 1, and
Prediction 6). The specification to test this assertion is as follows:
yit = β0 + β1Canonit + γi + δt + εit (5)
where yit is an indicator of whether the mayor was sentenced for corrup-
tion, Canonit is the logarithm of canon per capita received by district i in the
electoral cycle starting after year t 12, γi is a district fixed effect, δt is a year fixed
effect, and εit is an error term. The outcome yit in equation 5 is equal to 1 if three
conditions hold: 1) the mayor was sentenced for corruption, 2) the aggravated
entity was the municipality where she served, and 3) the date in which her first
municipality-related judicial file was opened is posterior to election year t. This is
not trivial because 1) many mayors are sued for corruption but few of these cases
actually make it past the investigative stage, let alone the definitive sentence; 2)
the theory that is being discussed has to do with a deteriorating local govern-
ment, therefore, the relevant crimes are not just any kind of crime but rather those
that affect the municipality directly, and 3) some mayors may have a past crim-
inal record but this test in particular has to do with corruption deeds once she
becomes the mayor.
Ideally, criteria number 3 would be not only that his/her first file was opened
after the election, but that the crime itself happened after the election, and during
that particular term (so, before the next election year). However, the available
data does not allow for this variable to be constructed in such way. The only
date that is available for every case in the PPEDC data is the date embedded in
the name of the judicial file (Expediente judicial), which coincides with the year
in which the case surpasses the investigative stage and the trial begins13. The
date of the sentence is also available for most cases. The date of the crime itself,
12As explained in the previous section, elected officials assume their post in January of the
year following the elections and hold office for four years. So, canonit, for 2002, is an average of
per capita canon transfers received in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006; for 2006, it is an average of
2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010; and for 2010, an average of 2011, 2012, and 2013.
13In local jargon, it is the year in which a case with a Carpeta Fiscal is deemed worthy of an
Expediente judicial.
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however, is never available. This is indeed a limitation of the data, and it required
some working assumptions.
Implicitly, I am assuming that if the file was opened during a mayoral term,
the crime happened during that mayoral term. This may sound questionable be-
cause the corruption deed could be from a previous term in which the mayor had
been in office. However, in 73% of cases in which yit equals one, the mayor is
in his/her first term ever as mayor. That means that the municipality-related cor-
ruption file being opened can not be from a previous term. Another figure to take
into account is that in 2017, 28% of current14 mayors were being prosecuted for
corruption (PPEDC, 2018). This suggests that it is rather common that corruption
crimes by authorities start to be investigated while they are still in office.
The rest of hypotheses have to do with the mechanisms that would explain
the overall effect of canon transfers on corruption; namely: a decreased electoral
punishment of corruption (part 1 of Prediction 1), a worsening pool of opponents
for the incumbents who run for reelection (Prediction 4), and a resulting increased
probability of reelection as a function of transfers (Prediction 5).
An empirical test of the first mechanism (decreased electoral punishment
of corruption) is specified in Equation 6. Rit is the reelection outcome (0/1), yit is 1
if the incumbent seeking reelection comitted a corruption crime, and beforeit is 1
if corruption was disclosed before this reelection attempt. If there is a punishment
for corruption, β6 should be negative (indicating that a disclosed crime prior to
the election lowers the chances of reelection), and if such punishment decreases
when windfalls15 increase, β7 should be positive.
14Mayors that had been elected for the period 2015-2018
15In this case, the canon variable refers to the average of the years leading to the election (i.e.
the second measure explained in the preceding section) because of the nature of the outcome
that is being considered: it is an outcome whose realization occurs in the year of the election and
not during the period of office.
25
Rit = β0 + β1Canonit + β2yit + β3beforeit
+ β4Canonit × yit + β5Canonit × beforeit + β6yit × beforeit
+ β7Canonit × yit × beforeit + γi + δt + εit
(6)
With the available data, however, it is not feasible to test this assertion
because we do not have precise information about the date of disclosure of the
corruption deed. As was explained before, the only date that is available for every
case is the judicial file date. Even if the three dates of interest were available
simultaneously (crime, file opening, sentence), it is not clear which (if any) of
them would represent the date when corruption was disclosed to citizens because
they could become aware of it and make their own judgements at any moment
between the corruption crime and the sentence. Defining which date is best as a
proxy of disclosure date would require further qualitative work.
The empirical test of hypothesis 3 is an extension of the one for hypothesis
1 in the sense that it looks again into the effect of windfalls on corruption but
seeks to assess if such effect is attenuated when the incumbent’s challengers
are of higher quality. See equation 7. As for equation 5, the expected sign of β1
is positive, reflecting the positive effect of windfalls on corruption. Furthermore,
if such effect is attenuated in the presence of higher quality opponents, then the
coefficient accompanying the interaction of windfalls × quality of opponents, β3,
should be negative.
yit = β0 + β1Canonit + β2ExpOpponentsit
+ β3Canonit × ExpOpponentsit + γi + δt + εit
(7)
Finally, hypotheses 4 and 5 are testable and the specification is the same
as in equation (5), except the outcome is a measure of the quality (J in the model)
of the pool of opponents for hypothesis 4, and then the probability of reelection
of the incumbent for hypothesis 5. These two estimations apply only for the sub-
sample of districts where an incumbent mayor actually runs for reelection. Also,
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in these two regressions the measure of canon employed is the average of canon
transfers received by the district in the four years leading to the election.
To sum up all the hypotheses outlined so far, it is useful to see a timeline
of the outcomes that enter the regressions. This is also helpful to explain how
I restrict the sample for every estimation. To work within a single institutional
framework, I only consider years after 2001, when the latest Canon Law was
approved. For hypotheses 1 and 3, I include electoral periods starting after 2002,
2006, 2010 and 2014. There is one caveat to make about the post 2014 electoral
period.
Because of its recency, there are too few sentences for mayors of that
period. Table 2 shows the number of mayors sentenced by mayoral term. Un-
surprisingly, the number of mayors sentenced is lower for 2010 and 2014 when
compared to 2002 and 2006. More recent mayors are less likely to be sentenced
not necessarily because incidence of corruption is lower in more recent terms,
but rather because there has not been enough time for their cases to receive a
sentence16. Because I am including year fixed effects, this is not a major concern;
however, I replicate all estimations regarding hypotheses 1 and 3 excluding the
post-2014 term.
Table 2: Number of mayors sentenced by term
Mayoral term Not sentenced Sentenced Total
2003-2006 1702 114 1816
(93.72%) (6.29%) (100.00%)
2007-2010 1704 106 1810
(94.14%) (5.86%) (100.00%)
2011-2014 1749 51 1800
(97.17%) (2.83%) (100.00%)
2015-2018 1806 5 1811
(99.72%) (0.28%) (100.00%)
Source: PPEDC.
When testing hypotheses 4 and 5, I include electoral years 2006, 2010,
and 2014 in the sample. Year 2002 can not be included in neither because of the
16This could be confirmed if there were available data on cases at each step of the judicial
process, but such data is not public. As explained before, only cases with a definitive sentence
are consolidated and delivered upon request.
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data restrictions explained in the previous section.
Figure 2: Timeline of events
2002 Elections 2006 Elections 2010 Elections 2014 Elections
2015 20161999 2012 2013 20142006 2007 2008 2009 2010 20112000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
5 Results
The overall effect of windfalls on corruption was evaluated first, and the results are
presented in Table 3. The outcome is a binary variable which equals 1 if the mayor
of that term was sentenced for corruption17.The first column shows results for all
districts with available data, including mayoral terms starting after 2002, 2006,
2010 and 2014. The second column excludes districts in departments without
significant geographic variation in canon transfers. As mentioned before, this is
the preferred sample because using it is more consistent with the identification
strategy. The third column shows results when I also exclude producing districts.
Even though samples differ by column, the specification in the three of them refers
to Equation 5, so the regressor of interest is the contemporaneous measure of
canon.
Columns (4) through (6) in the same table repeat the estimations of (1) -
(3) but in this case the regressor is the lagged measure of canon transfers. Any-
time I use the lagged canon measure, I exclude 2002 because lagged canon for
2002 would include years before 2001, and that falls outside of the selected time-
frame18. Finally, columns (7) through (9) present results when I include both the
contemporaneous measure and the lagged measure in the same regression. All
17For more details on how this outcome was constructed, see section 3.
18These results are still positive and significant if I include 2002.
28
results in this Table (3) support the hypothesis that windfalls increase the inci-
dence of corruption.
Because of the concerns discussed in section 4 regarding the too few sen-
tences for mayors who served during 2015-2018, I repeat these estimations ex-
cluding the post 2014 mayoral term. Results are shown in Table 4. The direction
and magnitude of effects remain very similar for every specification (with current
canon, lagged canon or both) and sample (all districts, excluding those without
geographic variation, excluding producing districts), compared to their equivalent
in Table 3. However, effects are not significant for regressions in columns (1), (2)
and (3) that employ the contemporaneous canon measure.
In the model, contemporaneous canon is expected to affect corruption
through a moral hazard channel. Lagged canon is expected to affect corruption
through a negative selection effect that aggravates the moral hazard problem.
Because results for contemporaneous canon are sensitive to the exclusion of one
electoral term, it is not possible to say anything conclusive regarding the moral
hazard channel so far. However, there is a robust positive effect of lagged canon
on corruption. Moreover, when including lagged and contemporaneous canon
simultaneously in the regression (columns (7) through (9)), marginal effects for
lagged canon reamain almost identical (compare (4), (5), (6) to (7), (8), (9)), and
estimated marginal effects for contemporaneous canon are larger.
This suggests that the effect of contemporaneous windfalls on corruption
might be conditional on the level of transfers received in the preceding electoral
term. This could happen because windfalls from the preceding term affect the
quality of candidates that are drawn to compete. This is consistent with results for
hypothesis 4, which deals with selection effects more specifically.
Before moving on to the next set of results, it is important to emphasize that
any time trend that there may be in our outcome of interest (e.g. a widespread
increase/decrease of the incidence of corruption from one term to another, or the
mechanical “recency bias” —fewer sentences for more recent terms—) is con-
trolled for with the inclusion of year fixed effects. Furthermore, all regressions
29
include district fixed effects, to control for time-invariant unobservable character-
istics of districts that might affect corruption.
Table 3: Hypothesis 1 - Effect of windfalls on corruption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES
Canon cycle 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Canon previous cycle 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.021***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 7,217 6,888 6,492 5,406 5,158 4,829 5,405 5,157 4,828
R-squared 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.033 0.035 0.035 0.036 0.037 0.037
Number of districts 1,839 1,749 1,707 1,835 1,750 1,694 1,834 1,749 1,693
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exclude NoGeo No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Exclude Producers No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Mean dependent variable 0.0382 0.0389 0.0393 0.0300 0.0308 0.0309 0.0300 0.0308 0.0309
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Hypothesis 1 - Effect of windfalls on corruption, excluding 2014
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES
Canon cycle 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.019* 0.019* 0.016
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Canon previous cycle 0.010* 0.012** 0.014** 0.013** 0.015** 0.016***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 5,414 5,168 4,905 3,602 3,437 3,241 3,602 3,437 3,241
R-squared 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.016 0.017 0.016
Number of districts 1,835 1,745 1,698 1,830 1,745 1,680 1,830 1,745 1,680
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exclude NoGeo No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Exclude Producers No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Mean dependent variable 0.0501 0.0509 0.0510 0.0436 0.0448 0.0444 0.0436 0.0448 0.0444
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
As mentioned in section 2, the relationship between windfalls and corrup-
tion could be non-monotonic. In particular, it could be the case that up to some
level of canon, the effect on corruption is positive but after such point (so, when
transfers are extremely high), the effect starts to decrease.
This could happen because when transfers reach a certain level that is
too high, it may become more evident for citizens that the resources received
surpass the spending capacity of the district, and they may become more vigilant
of authorities.
The rationale for including a quadratic term has to do with the moral hazard
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effect. Therefore, the results in Table 5 have linear and squared terms of contem-
poraneous canon as the variables of interest. The linear term has a positive
significant effect on corruption, and the squared term has the negative signifi-
cant coefficient that is consistent with a decreasing effect past some threshold of
windfalls 19.
Table 5: Hypothesis 1 - Non-monotonic effects of windfalls on corruption
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Canon cycle 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.029***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Canon cycle 2 -0.002** -0.002*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
year = 2006 -0.013 -0.011 -0.011
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
year = 2010 -0.043*** -0.042*** -0.039***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
year = 2014 -0.064*** -0.063*** -0.063***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 7,217 6,888 6,492
R-squared 0.028 0.028 0.027
Number of districts 1,839 1,749 1,707
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Exclude NoGeo No Yes Yes
Exclude Producers No No Yes
Mean dependent variable 0.0382 0.0389 0.0393
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
For testing hypothesis 3, I take the specification of equation 7 and esti-
mate it for all districts where there is an incumbent running for reelection. Results
are presented in Table 6 (including electoral periods that start after 2006, 2010
and 2014). In columns (1) through (3), the coefficients of interest are those cor-
responding to Canon cycle and to the interaction of Canon cycle with the aver-
age experience of the pool of opponents. Both have the expected sign (positive
and negative, respectively), but they are not significant20. The previous finding
19To be consistent, I also replicate these estimations excluding the post 2014 mayoral term.
Results are very similar and can be found in Table 11 in the Appendix.
20Results are replicated excluding the post 2014 mayoral term and results are presented in
Table 12 of the Appendix. Again, coefficients are of the expected sign but not significant.
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pointed to a non-monotonic effect of windfalls. Therefore, it is important to say
that, building on that result, hypothesis number 3 was also evaluated including
the second order polinomial specification of Table 5 plus the corresponding inter-
actions. Again, coefficients had the expected sign, but were not significant. In
summary, I do not find evidence supporting the theoretical prediction that a better
pool of opponents attenuates the (positive) effect of windfalls on corruption.
Table 6: Hypothesis 3 - Differential effect of windfalls on corruption depending on
quality of oppositors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES
Canon cycle 0.0100 0.0093 0.0098 0.0126 0.0120 0.0173
(0.0079) (0.0084) (0.0093) (0.0110) (0.0112) (0.0128)
Avg. work exp. opponents 0.0012 0.0013 0.0016 0.0023 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.0028 0.0032*
(0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Canon cycle × Avg. exp opps -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0010
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008)
year = 2010 -0.0329*** -0.0331*** -0.0303*** -0.0552*** -0.0579*** -0.0577*** -0.0560*** -0.0587*** -0.0590***
(0.0091) (0.0094) (0.0095) (0.0135) (0.0144) (0.0149) (0.0136) (0.0145) (0.0150)
year = 2014 -0.0440*** -0.0463*** -0.0431*** -0.0684*** -0.0724*** -0.0703*** -0.0638*** -0.0682*** -0.0672***
(0.0093) (0.0099) (0.0100) (0.0133) (0.0142) (0.0143) (0.0132) (0.0143) (0.0145)
Canon previous cycle 0.0219** 0.0233** 0.0265*** 0.0199** 0.0210** 0.0211**
(0.0091) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0094) (0.0096) (0.0099)
Canon previous cycle × Avg. exp opps -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Observations 3,273 3,109 2,916 3,273 3,109 2,916 3,273 3,109 2,916
R-squared 0.027 0.028 0.025 0.031 0.033 0.031 0.033 0.034 0.033
Number of districts 1,671 1,589 1,519 1,671 1,589 1,519 1,671 1,589 1,519
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exclude NoGeo No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Exclude Producers No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Mean dependent variable 0.0330 0.0338 0.0346 0.0330 0.0338 0.0346 0.0330 0.0338 0.0346
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Results for hypothesis 4; namely, that windfalls negatively affect the qual-
ity of the pool of opponents to the incumbent, are presented in Table 7. In each
column, quality of opponents is proxied by a different variable: average years of
work experience of the pool of opponents, average years of formal education,
and fraction of opponents with formal higher education. Using the three different
measures, the estimated effect of windfalls on the quality of opponents is consis-
tently negative and significant. Specifically, an increase of per capita canon trans-
fers equivalent to one standard deviation (S/713.00 soles from 200921) causes a
reduction of 1 year in the average work experience of the opponents to the in-
cumbent, a reduction of 0.5 years in the average years of formal education of
21This is the standard deviation in the sample that entered this estimation: 3109 observations
corresponding to 1589 districts × the number of elections when there was an incumbent running
in the district (could be 1, 2 or 3).
32
opponents to the incumbent, and a reduction of 4.5 percentage points in the frac-
tion of opponents that have completed formal higher education. The reported
results are those obtained when excluding the departments without significant
geographic variation (Loreto, Ucayali, Callao, and Tumbes). This is the preferred
sample to be consistent with the identification strategy as explained before. How-
ever, results are extremely similar (and also significant) when considering the full
sample and/or excluding producing districts. These results point to a large effect
of windfalls on the quality of politicians attracted to compete for public office.
Table 7: Hypothesis 4 - Quality of opponents to the incumbent
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Work experience Educ. years % with Higher Ed
Canon previous cycle -0.410** -0.240** -0.020**
(0.169) (0.099) (0.008)
year = 2010 6.111*** 2.885*** 0.118***
(0.304) (0.192) (0.016)
year = 2014 5.732*** 2.756*** 0.185***
(0.296) (0.180) (0.015)
Observations 3,109 3,109 3,109
R-squared 0.317 0.249 0.132
Number of districts 1,589 1,589 1,589
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Exclude NoGeo Yes Yes Yes
Exclude Producers No No No
Mean dependent variable 10.30 12.39 0.406
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Finally, I present results regarding the effect of windfalls on the probability
of reelection. I disaggregate this into three estimations. To save on space, Ta-
bles summarizing these findings are in the Appendix. In Table 13 the outcome
is whether the incumbent mayor decides to run for reelection. In columns (1)
through (3), the specification only includes a linear term. In (4) through (6), a
quadratic term is also included. All results point to a positive effect of windfalls on
the probability that the incumbent runs for reelection. This makes sense because
availability of larger resources makes holding public office more attractive. How-
ever, I find no significant effect of windfalls on the probability of being reelected,
conditional on running, as can be seen in Table 14. Finally, I find an overall (in-
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conditional) effect of windfalls on reelection that is positive and significant (not
reported here). The previous results suggest that this is driven by more incum-
bents seeking reelection, rather than by more incumbents winning the reelection.
Before moving on to discussing results in the concluding section, there is
one more hypothesis to consider, which is that corruption is a decreasing function
of the quality of the incumbent and of the expected quality of the opponent. It is
not easy to identify empirically such effect, in a way that could be credibly causal.
The reason is that there is no source of exogenous variation in the candidates’
education. However, I can provide descriptive evidence that corruption is indeed
less prevalent among mayors with higuer levels of education. The probability of
being sentenced for corruption is 1 percentage point lower (alternatively, 27%
lower) in the group of mayors with formal higher education relative to the group of
mayors withou such educational attainment. This difference is significant to the
5%. Furthermore, there is a negative correlation between corruption and years
of formal education (significant to the 5% level); and also between corruption and
years of work experience (significant to the 10% level). This is important because
it is one of the pieces that gives credence to the theoretical model set up.
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Conclusions
In this paper I discussed some political channels through which a natural resource
curse may opperate. Drawing from the contributions by Brollo et al. 2013, I outline
several hypotheses about the plausible effects of windfall resources on corruption
and selection into politics.
Abundance of windfalls could increase the incidence of corruption because
their presence aggravates the moral hazard problem that is assumed to exist be-
tween citizens and their elected authorities in standard political economy models.
An increased budget means that officials can appropiate rents illegally without
compromising their obligations with the electorate, thus distorting the inferences
that citizens make about their authorities’ competence. This, in turn, impairs the
disciplining role of elections, in which, absent a windfall of money, corrupt mayors
would be less likely to be reappointed.
This problem could be aggravated if lower-quality candidates are drawn to
compete with the incumbent. The prediction is that this deterioration of the pool
of opponents will indeed take place because political rents are more valuable for
the relatively less-skilled. This is an assumption of the model presented, but is
consistent with high-quality candidates having higher quality outside options in
the private sector, that they would lose if they were caught appropriating rents
illegally in the public sector.
The commodity boom that took place during the 2000s generated an un-
precedented redistribution of fiscal resources to local governments in Peru. In this
paper, I argued that the spike in prices, combined with the redistribution canon
law approved in 2001, generate a suitable setting to test the hypotheses outlined
above. With a difference in differences approach, I test empirically most of the
implications stemming from the theoretical model.
To sum up, I find significant evidence of a positive overall effect of windfalls
on corruption. I also find strong evidence of a sizeable effect of windfalls on the
quality of opponents challenging incumbents. Of course, this second result is for
the subsample of districts where there is a mayor running for reelection (around
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60% of them). However, I find no significant evidence that better opponents atten-
uate (conversely, that worse opponents aggravate) the effect that windfalls have
on corruption. In other words, I do not find evidence that the link between the two
phenomena is the one proposed in the model. Considering it carefully, it is not
all that surprising because such a link would imply that mayors are very sophis-
ticated agents that are capable of foreseeing the quality of opponents they will
face, and factor this into their decision of how much to give in to their rent-seeking
behavior. This is not to say that there is not a link between moral hazard prob-
lems and selection problems. There could be other ways in which these two are
related.
The biggest limitation in terms of data is definitely the one on corruption.
One reason is that it does not allow to construct a continuous (let alone a normal-
ized) measure of corruption. That would require having the amount of resources
compromised in the illegal activity (or even better, the amount compromised as
a fraction of total municipal budget, for example). However, this is not something
systematically gathered or reported by the judicial authorities. It would be tempt-
ing to use the amount of civil reparation as a proxy, but rules for setting it are
explicitly influenced by how mediatic the corruption crime is (in order to somehow
monetize the “moral” damage inflicted to the institution). This decision, although
understandable, renders the civil reparation unsuitable as a proxy for size of theft.
Another limitation of corruption data is that only sentences are disclosed.
It would be ideal to have available information on the number of cases opened,
not just those that make it to the final stage. Having such data would allow to
confront other possible interpretations of the findings. In particular, it could be
the case that the effect of windfalls on corruption is capturing not only a moral
hazard effect but a mechanical “prosecution” effect. What I mean by this is that it
could be that it is not only (or at all) that windfalls increase corruption, but rather
that windfalls make prosecutors focus more heavily on those districts with more
resources and therefore, the probability of detection goes up. Although this is
a relevant concern in general, I think it is not that fundamental in the context of
36
Peru. The reason is that all the anecdotal evidence gathered by prosecutors and
commented in their periodic reports (some of which are cited in this paper) points
to a lack of possibilities for the PPEDC to act upon their own initiative. Multiple
prosecutors comment that what should be a proactive agency to prosecute cor-
ruption strategically, ends up many times being just one more branch of standard
judicial prosecution.
This paper leaves open a very interesting research agenda which should
incorporate more complete data on corruption. Furthermore, the long-term conse-
quences of the windfalls shock will require careful consideration of the “production
effects” discussed as a concern in the empirical section. Also, it is necessary to
take into account how corruption may become something that not just comes and
goes with the mayor in office, but rather grows some roots into institutions in ways
that are not visible by only looking at sentenced top-rank authorities.
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Figure 6: Canon transfers, 2003
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Figure 7: Canon transfers, 2005
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Table 11: Hypothesis 1 - Non-monotonic effects - Excluding 2014
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Canon cycle 0.019* 0.018* 0.021**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
c.logcanon_pc_fw#c.logcanon_pc_fw -0.002 -0.002 -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
year = 2006 -0.013 -0.010 -0.010
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
year = 2010 -0.043*** -0.041*** -0.039***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Observations 5,414 5,168 4,905
R-squared 0.010 0.010 0.009
Number of districts 1,835 1,745 1,698
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Exclude NoGeo No Yes Yes
Exclude Producers No No Yes
Mean dependent variable 0.0501 0.0509 0.0510
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 12: Hypothesis 3 - Excluding 2014
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES
Canon PC Promedio ciclo 0.0312** 0.0317** 0.0362** 0.0472** 0.0487** 0.0606***
(0.0155) (0.0156) (0.0166) (0.0197) (0.0199) (0.0223)
Anios de experiencia laboral promedio de oponentes 0.0012 0.0016 0.0015 0.0031 0.0035 0.0038* 0.0040* 0.0047* 0.0052**
(0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0025)
c.logcanon_pc_fw#c.exp_pool_opp -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0016
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0012)
year = 2010 -0.0245** -0.0246** -0.0214* -0.0532*** -0.0554*** -0.0590*** -0.0615*** -0.0651*** -0.0703***
(0.0111) (0.0115) (0.0117) (0.0173) (0.0186) (0.0191) (0.0185) (0.0201) (0.0204)
Canon PC Promedio ciclo anterior 0.0297** 0.0310** 0.0373*** 0.0290** 0.0300** 0.0338**
(0.0129) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0146) (0.0148) (0.0154)
c.logcanon_pc#c.exp_pool_opp -0.0012** -0.0013** -0.0014** -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0001
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0013)
Observations 2,218 2,118 2,009 2,218 2,118 2,009 2,218 2,118 2,009
R-squared 0.023 0.024 0.023 0.027 0.028 0.030 0.034 0.035 0.040
Number of idaux 1,528 1,461 1,399 1,528 1,461 1,399 1,528 1,461 1,399
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 13: Hypothesis 5 - Probability of running for reelection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
Canon PC Promedio ciclo anterior 0.028** 0.040*** 0.037*** 0.081*** 0.091*** 0.104***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
c.logcanon_pc#c.logcanon_pc -0.007** -0.007** -0.010***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
year = 2010 -0.071*** -0.097*** -0.092*** -0.067*** -0.093*** -0.086***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023)
year = 2014 -0.072*** -0.102*** -0.107*** -0.069*** -0.098*** -0.102***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Observations 5,406 5,158 4,829 5,406 5,158 4,829
R-squared 0.004 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.009 0.011
Number of idaux 1,835 1,750 1,694 1,835 1,750 1,694
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 14: Hypothesis 5 - Probability of reelection, conditional on running
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
Canon PC Promedio ciclo anterior 0.008 0.014 0.012 0.026 0.030 0.042
(0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036)
c.logcanon_pc#c.logcanon_pc -0.002 -0.002 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
year = 2010 -0.014 -0.024 -0.024 -0.012 -0.022 -0.020
(0.031) (0.033) (0.034) (0.031) (0.033) (0.034)
year = 2014 -0.045 -0.063** -0.065** -0.043 -0.061** -0.062**
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030)
Observations 3,273 3,109 2,916 3,273 3,109 2,916
R-squared 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.004
Number of idaux 1,671 1,589 1,519 1,671 1,589 1,519
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
